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Abstract
Between the late 1960s and the 1990s vast changes in social norms and insti-
tutions took place in relation to women￿ s rights. This paper explores the issue of
whether women￿ s rights have brought women higher welfare. Using individual level
data on life satisfaction and focusing on the staggered timing of law changes on
abortion rights in twelve European countries, I obtain an average treatment e⁄ect
on the treated from di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences. The identi￿cation strategy uses the
fact that exposure to women￿ s rights varied by gender, country of residence and
date of birth. I show that the extension of abortion rights is strongly linked to an
increase in life satisfaction of women of childbearing age. The introduction of the
pill in national public policies had an analogous e⁄ect, while mutual consent divorce
laws decreased women￿ s welfare. Being in a country with high maternity protection
does not a⁄ect the results. These ￿ndings are true after controlling for age e⁄ects,
unobserved heterogeneity across countries and time, and country-speci￿c trends. It
is robust to various econometric concerns.
Keywords: Natural experiment, Di⁄erences in di⁄erences, Women￿ s rights, Wel-
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An advertisement for an American department store in 19501:
What￿ s college? That￿ s where girls who are above cooking and sewing go
to meet a man so they can spend their lives cooking and sewing.
An American family planning poster in the early 1940s2:
Modern life is based on control and science. We control the speed of our
automobile. We control machines. We endeavor to control disease and death.
Let us control the size of our family to ensure health and happiness.
A key issue in public economics is to evaluate the e⁄ects of public policies. Between
the late 1960s and the 1990s vast and deep changes in social norms and institutions
took place in relation to women￿ s rights. Women as a pressure group became visible and
started to be in￿ uential and progressively represented in the political decision power.
Equal treatment and reproductive rights became two hotly debated topics of political
discourse and laws to address them were enacted in the majority of Western countries.
Their goal was to improve women￿ s welfare, and similarly to other public policy initia-
tives, they required funding to implement them. After ten to thirty years of such public
policies, we can evaluate their e⁄ects.
There is no a priori bet on the direction and the size, if any, of these e⁄ects. The
previous literature has elaborated theoretical models, but no empirical evaluation has
been undertaken, to my knowledge. With some exceptions, economists generally expect
a resulting increase in welfare from policies that removed binding constraints on women￿ s
choices.
In the public discourse the opinion is fragmented. It is not clear whether women have
really achieved parity in the public sphere, and if this is the case, whether the double
role of being the primary caregiver in the family and a worker has not just imposed a
double burden on women.3 It is often argued that women "could not have it all" and
that they are not better o⁄ now.
As a ￿rst step in the assessment of the e⁄ect of women￿ s rights, I focus on the policy
of extending birth control rights, and in particular abortion rights, on women￿ s welfare in
Europe. Between the late 1960s and 2000, following two thousand years of non regulation
and only 150 years of regulation4, most Western countries legalised abortion with a large
1Reported by Watkins (1998), p.9.
2Reported by Marks (2001), p.21.
3The debate talks about the "struggle to balance work and care-giving" (Institute for Women￿ s Policy
Research, online) and "having-it-all has changed to work-life balance" (Guardian, 13.9.2003).
4Reproductive rights were perceived as a path-breaking right in 1960s and 1970s, but they had been a
privately regulated issue for almost two thousand years, from the ancient Greek through the Middle Ages
to the eighteenth century. It was only in the nineteenth century that abortion came to be prohibited by
law and contraception looked at negatively in most Western countries.
1heterogeneity of timing and forms.
The theoretical channel of in￿ uence of birth control rights on welfare and utility
considered here is that, by changing the predictability in the timing of childbearing,
they a⁄ect the planning horizon that women consider when optimising their choices of
investment in education and work. Thus an increase in birth control possibilities raises
the optimal choice of education and improves the job market prospects of women. In
addition, men could be better o⁄ when reproductive rights exist because they obtain a
better match in the marriage market.
In a natural experiment, I exploit the exogenous natural variation given by the stag-
gered and uncoordinated legalisation of abortion in twelve European countries between
1967 and 1998.
I concentrate on private bene￿ts to individuals, stemming from changes to their set
of incentives and choices, rather than on societal or "public good" e⁄ects. The analysis
does not focus on the general e⁄ect of deriving utility (or disutility) purely from the
fact that such laws exist, for instance, because the individual has a taste for individual
rights, or because he considers abortion negatively on moral grounds and thus receives
disutility. This does not engender systematic changes in behaviour.
The identi￿cation of the welfare e⁄ect comes from the fact that the exposure of
an individual to abortion rights varied by gender, by country of residence and date of
birth. A di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences estimator allows to identify the e⁄ect of laws passed by
certain countries at di⁄erent times and which a⁄ected particular groups of individuals,
women of childbearing age (treatment group), with respect to control groups. Two
control groups are identi￿ed. The ￿rst comprises women who were not exposed to
abortion rights, either because they lived in countries and years with abortion rights,
but had completed the fertility cycle, or because their country did not legalise abortion.
Controlling for age e⁄ects, it is shown that this set is comparable to the treatment group.
The second control group consists of men in the same cohort of age as the treatment
group (i.e. less than 50 years old) when birth control rights were introduced. Controlling
for possible gender e⁄ects, the two groups are comparable for what concerns welfare in
terms of life cycle events. Statistical techniques, the use of ￿xed e⁄ects and the inclusion
of individual controls in the analysis make the results robust to elements of heterogeneity,
such as additive systematic variation of life satisfaction across countries and, to some
extent, across individuals.
The main ￿nding is that women who could be a⁄ected by birth control rights, i.e.
were of childbearing age when the policy was introduced, consistently show an increase
in welfare, according to all speci￿cations used. It is robust to a number of alternative
speci￿cations and control experiments.
The magnitude of the welfare gain is equivalent to the gain from going up one level
on a 12-category scale of income (this e⁄ect is largely constant along the income scale)
2or of having higher rather than middle education. It is smaller (around one seventh)
than the corresponding welfare loss from being unemployed or separated.
Additional sources of variation in the application of the policy are considered, such
as the number of years that women have been exposed to the policy, their age when
abortion was legalised, the "intensity" of rights, given by the distinction between partial
and full abortion rights, and the role of religious institutions and religious membership.
Religious institutions may have hindered the adoption or the application of the laws in
some countries, while religious membership, by creating a parallel set of laws for the
individual, may have a⁄ected the individual willingness to consider birth control rights
as an option.
Concerns about the role of concurring policies in favour of women are addressed,
examining the e⁄ect of the introduction of the pill in national public policies, changes to
divorce law and the interaction of abortion rights with maternity leave policies provided
in the same country.
In the empirical literature, there is no direct study of the link between reproductive
rights and individual welfare. This paper appears to be the ￿rst to engage in the empirical
evaluation of the e⁄ect of birth control rights on women￿ s welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews how the
paper relates to the literature. Section 3 presents a simple model on the link between
birth control rights and the individual optimal choice of education, from which empirical
predictions can be derived. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical strategy.
Section 5 presents the main empirical results. Section 6 extends the results in various
directions. Section 7 concludes. The appendix lists the sources of all variables used in
the analysis.
2 Related literature
There are two opposing perspectives in the economic literature on the theoretical link
between welfare and birth control rights. The dominant one is that birth control and
abortion rights have shifted out the frontier of available choices and thus could only
increase women￿ s welfare. The opposing view is that the same rights have weakened
the bargaining position of women in the marriage market and lost protection for their
gender-speci￿c role of mother, ultimately losing welfare.
Goldin and Katz (2002) are an example of the ￿rst school. Their hypothesis is that
the pill allowed sex without commitments and lowered the cost of delaying marriage.
Thus it allowed young and single women to invest more in graduate and professional
education and achieve better careers, and still obtain a good match in the marriage
market. The match in marriage could even possibly be a better one, due to a "social
multiplier e⁄ect" that made the market for "career women" thicker. They use this
3framework to test whether in the United States access to the pill by women when they
were 18 to 21 years old a⁄ected their decision to go to university and to marry later and
￿nd positive results.
The other strand in the literature emphasises the adverse welfare e⁄ects of birth
control possibilities on women. Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) set out to explain
the "feminisation of poverty" in the United States as a consequence of birth control
innovations. They link the large rise in out-of wedlock childbearing in the US between
1965 and 1990 and the decline of the "shotgun marriage", i.e. the bundling of sexual
commitments with commitment devices. Their ￿nding is only applicable to a speci￿c set
of circumstances. They focus on men who never prefer to marry and women who prefer
marriage in every period. This obviously creates an initial mismatch and competition of
women for the available men. Moreover women are homogeneous and cannot di⁄erentiate
themselves in the marriage market (e.g. through education). When birth control exists,
the equilibrium shifts to a situation where women lose the possibility of demanding
marriage in exchange for sex, thus lose the transfers brought by marriage. Those who
lose more are those who fail to adopt birth control and end up with a child born out
of wedlock and without the income brought by a marriage. In this framework, when
abortion and birth control became available, women invested more in human capital
because they expected less rents from marriage.
According to Siow (2002) the parameter that is key to the welfare calculation is the
relative supply of marriageable men to marriageable women . In general, as women
are fecund for a shorter period than men, women are relatively scarce in the marriage
market and innovations in birth control improve their welfare. Only if the supply of
marriageable men is extremely scarce, with birth control technologies, fewer transfers
are needed to induce women to cohabit or to get or to stay married and their welfare is
decreased.
On the empirical side, there is no direct study of the link between reproductive
rights and welfare, although there is a vast literature on unintended pregnancies and
their negative e⁄ect on well-being of children and families, both mental and physical
(e.g., Gruber, Levine and Staiger, 1999).
The use of staggered timing of the introduction of legalised abortion is not new in the
literature, although so far it has been limited to the US and the Roe vs. Wade case. It
has been used as a source of variation by Levine et al (1999) to study fertility e⁄ects, by
Angrist and Evans (1998) to study the impact on female labour supply, and by Donohue
and Levitt (2001) to examine the e⁄ect on criminality rates.
This paper also connects to the literature on the analysis of the changing social
structure of marriage. Edlund and Pande (2002) relate the decline in marriage to more
left-wing voting for women through the shifting of the preference of the median female
voter towards more redistribution.
4Finally, the paper relates to an emerging literature in economics that infers welfare
changes from self-reported well-being answers. Among others, see Easterlin (1974),
Clark and Oswald (1994), Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001), and Gruber and
Mullainathan (2002).
3 The model
The three main channels through which birth control rights can a⁄ect individual utility
are through a reduction in unwanted children, through a general empowerment of women,
and through a better planning of education choices for women.
In the ￿rst channel, birth control rights diminish the portion of fertility that is
undesired and lead to a direct increase of utility. This is trivial to model but di¢ cult
to test in the data. In future work, it would be interesting to include explicitly in the
explanation two additional channels by which birth control laws can a⁄ect utility.
The second channel is that of changing the benchmark of social norms. Akerlof and
Kranton (2000) describe the way that identity depends on the assigned social categories
and on the extent to which one￿ s given characteristics match the ideal of the assigned
category. Granting individual rights on reproduction to women changed not only the
individual choice of fertility. It also empowered women with a kit of social identities
distinct from those related to the woman￿ s role within the family. New social categories
were born that women could confront themselves with. An attempt to identify this e⁄ect
is made in the empirical analysis when dealing with Catholic versus Protestant countries,
where the di⁄erence in the social categories considered appropriate for women is likely
to be more pronounced.
The third channel lends itself to a clean analysis, both formally and empirically.
Here I present a simple formalisation that links birth control laws, education choices
and welfare changes for women and their partners, as it lends itself to predictions that
can be tested by analysis.
There are N individuals of two types i; i 2 fm;wg, where m denotes "man" and
w "woman". The number of individuals of type m equals the number of type w. Each
individual i maximises utility deriving from earnings (yi) and the quality of the match











Individual income, yi; is a function of the quantity of education ei; its cost per unit




in each period), the wage rate per unit of education and working time !,
the expected length of working life T, and an adjustment factor ￿ which measures the
5likelihood of unplanned fertility given country laws on birth control rights. The higher
￿, the higher the risk of an unwanted pregnancy for the individual. Since childbearing is
known empirically to reduce both the length of working time and the wage5, (1 ￿ ￿)T is
the horizon over which individuals e⁄ectively plan their decisions and reap the bene￿ts
from their choice of education.
Country laws on birth control could possibly a⁄ect individual welfare in two ways.
The "public good component" is the general e⁄ect of individuals deriving utility (or disu-
tility) purely from the fact that such laws exist, regardless of whether the individual can
make use of them. For instance, the individual may derive utility from it if he has a taste
for individual rights, or he may receive disutility if he considers abortion negatively on
moral grounds. The other component is a private utility one, a⁄ecting individual choices.
The analysis on the parameter ￿ identi￿es the private utility component of birth control
rights, a⁄ecting the planning horizon of the individual. The public good component is
not modelled here as it would not engender speci￿c behavioural implications.
The quality of marriage, mi; only depends on the quality of the partner as signalled
by his or her education, eP
i . I assume that the Becker model of marriage based on
assortative matching holds (Becker, 1973).6 In particular, prospective spouses do not
choose themselves on the basis of randomly allocated love, but on their being similar
in observable characteristics that signal underlying skills. I assume that investment in
education is the only observable signal of skills. The equilibrium matching depends
only on the relative position in the distribution of education (and skills) of that period,
matching the most educated man with the most educated woman, and so on for all men
and women in the ranking. This implies that i￿ s choice of education determines both
her stream of income and the type of person that she will marry.
The quality of marriage could in principle also include the utility from having chil-
dren. Birth control rights do not have any e⁄ect on the number of "planned" children
and on the utility deriving from them (it does a⁄ect their timing and spacing only), while
it a⁄ects the "production" of unplanned children. The implication is trivial. Introducing
birth control rights reduces the probability of disutility from unplanned children.
Given the form of individual utility, the optimal investment in education is:
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@e







The optimal investment in education is increasing in the length of working life, in
the wage rate, and in skills. It is decreasing in the extent to which fertility cannot be
5See Waldfogel (1998) for a good review of results.
6As Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2001) describe, this model is strongly corroborated in the em-
pirical literature.
6planned because of country laws, and in the cost per unit of education.
I am abstracting here from the possible endogeneity of education to marriage consid-
erations. In theory and in practice, matching considerations could endogenously a⁄ect
each individual￿ s choice of education (Coles, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1992). That is, an
individual could decide to invest more in education purely out of concern for improving
his or her position in the marriage market. Coles et al (1992) show that if this possi-
bility is allowed, two e⁄ects take place in equilibrium. First, everyone would (weakly)
increase their choice of education.7 Second, the relative position of the individual would
not change.8 If all individuals take into account how their education choice a⁄ects their
relative ranking and adjust their behaviour accordingly, the net e⁄ect of their decisions
is that noone moves up or down in the ranking over time.9 Thus the ranking and the
matching in the marriage market are the same whether I consider this mechanism or
not.
3.1 The e⁄ect of birth control rights: comparative statics
I focus on the role of birth control rights (i.e. abortion rights and access to the pill)
in a⁄ecting the planning horizon that individuals face when optimising their choice of
education, given their skills. I assume that the political action of granting birth control
rights is a matter of political economy, governed by where the median voter posits himself
towards these rights as a public good.
The factor ￿ a⁄ects the duration of working life and varies both by gender and as a
result of laws, with ￿ = ￿laws
i , with laws 2 fNR;Rg, where NR denotes "no rights" and
R denotes "rights allowed". Analogously, I denote ei = elaws
i and yi = ylaws
i ; respectively
the level of education and income in the presence of the two sets of laws.
Men have by de￿nition a zero probability of becoming pregnant, thus a perfect control
on the length of their working life with respect to childbearing (￿m = 0). In contrast,
women without birth control rights always have a less-than-perfect control on the timing
of childbearing, ￿w ￿ 0 (with equality holding only if the woman chooses to abstain from
sex). Birth control rights can bring to zero the probability of an unplanned pregnancy
and introduces variation in the optimal choice of education of women. The education
choices of men and women with the same level of skills generally di⁄er.
Let us de￿ne:
￿ With and without birth control rights, men have ￿NR
m = ￿R
m = 0. Men￿ s optimal
choice of education is eR
m = eNR
m :
7Property 2 in their model.
8Property 1 in their model.
9Coles et al (1992) derive their results for constant relative risk aversion utility functions, but show
that they apply to a broader class of utility functions.
7￿ Without birth control rights, women have ￿NR
w ￿ 0. Women￿ s optimal choice of
education is eNR
w :
￿ With birth control rights, women have ￿R
w = 0 and ￿R
w ￿ ￿NR
w . Women￿ s optimal
choice of education is eR
w:
Comparing the outcomes with and without birth control rights, the following results
can be derived.
Proposition 1 : With birth control rights, holding the level of individual skills con-
stant, men￿ s optimal investment in education does not change, while women￿ s optimal
investment is larger or equal than without rights, i.e. eR
w ￿ eNR
w : It follows that women￿ s
income is higher or equal with rights than without them, yR
w ￿ yNR




Coming to the marriage market, in equilibrium, given their skills, all women increase
their choice of education, such that their ranking in terms of education is preserved. The
ranking of men is also unchanged, since their investment in education does not change.
Thus positive assortative matching in the marriage market brings together the same
highest-ranking woman with the same highest-ranking man as before, and so on down
the ranking. The only di⁄erence is that men ￿nd a match in a better educated woman
than before, while women ￿nd a match in a man with the same level of education as
before. Proposition 2 then follows.
Proposition 2 : With birth control rights, men￿ s utility from the match in marriage is
larger or equal than without rights, while women￿ s utility is unchanged.
The concluding result is the one that will be tested in the empirical analysis.
Proposition 3 : With birth control rights, both men and women￿ s utility is larger or
equal than without rights. For women the e⁄ect goes through higher education and higher
income. For men the e⁄ect goes through ￿nding a better match in marriage.
This simple model describes one possible mechanism that links birth control laws and
welfare changes for women and their partners via their education choices. The model
reaches conclusions similar to Goldin and Katz (2002) with regard to the education
choice of women. In their work on the United States, they show that the availability
of the pill has signi￿cantly increased the investment in education of young women and
their wage. This is equivalent to a test of proposition 1.
The model presented here ignores issues of public goods that could a⁄ect one￿ s utility,
pre-existing wealth and other material and immaterial goods that could enter the utility
function. It also ignores the value of redistributive transfers that can take place within
8the marriage and which alter the spouses￿bargaining power. It simply models marriage
as an institution within which men and women derive the same amount of well-being
from mutual care. The simplicity of the model is clearly a limit, but I want to focus on
the change in the planning horizon of women, a mechanism that has not been spelled
out formally in the literature.
A fundamental question not addressed in this paper is why birth control rights are not
always granted, if it is true that they generally improve welfare. It would be interesting
to endogenise the law as part of a political economy process. One possible explanation
could be linked to the median voter having di⁄erent preferences from the "average"
one. A microfoundation for this could be nested in a household model with unequal
bargaining power in favour of men linked to a system of political representation where
men are over-represented.
4 Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Data description
A relatively recent development in economics is the possibility to directly evaluate the
welfare e⁄ect of policies by analysing surveys of life satisfaction. The answers of nation-
ally representative samples of individuals about their current life satisfaction are used
as revealed subjective utility levels. As long as these surveys are carried out in an in-
tertemporally constant way, they can provide a rich and consistent source of information
on welfare trends.
This source of data has the unique advantage of matching welfare levels with indi-
vidual characteristics. This combination of information allows to measure the e⁄ect of
government interventions or market changes on the welfare of very speci￿c groups of
individuals.
To test for the e⁄ect of birth control rights on welfare I analyse individual-level data
from the Eurobarometer survey for twelve European countries10 for the period 1975-
1998. The Eurobarometer has the unique advantage of providing consistent time series
for European countries, which present a wider variation in legal changes with respect to
abortion than the United States. This allows to identify the e⁄ect more precisely. It also
makes the problem of omitted variables less likely. Other international social surveys do
not provide data from as far back in time (ISSP since 1985, World Values Survey since
1980).
The Eurobarometer asks repeated cross-sections of individuals (totalling over 450,000)
a question on happiness and one on life satisfaction. The two are strongly correlated and
I use the data on life satisfaction, as it is more of a long-term indicator of welfare. The
10Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, and United Kingdom.
9survey asks: "On the whole, are you very satis￿ed, fairly satis￿ed, not very satis￿ed,
or not at all satis￿ed with the life you lead? Would you say you are...?" The answer
could be provided in four categories (plus the "don￿ t know" option): 1. Very satis￿ed,
2. Fairly satis￿ed, 3. Not very satis￿ed, 4. Not at all satis￿ed.11
The Eurobarometer also provides information on the gender of the respondent, his
or her marital status, age, occupation and religious feeling or membership. In this
analysis, exogenous characteristics like gender and age help identify the treatment and
control groups. Characteristics that could be endogenously a⁄ected by the extension of
rights are only used descriptively here, without claiming causation, to identify groups of
individuals who exhibit higher levels of life satisfaction.
The question sometimes arises among economists of whether subjective survey data
can and do provide true signals of welfare (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). In theory,
one possible measurement problem could arise from the framing of the question. In the
Eurobarometer, the question is always framed in the same way over each country and
year, and any other bias arising from framing, as long as is additive (language, ordering of
questions and alternatives, wording, scaling of answers, social desirability of some answer
with respect to others), is controlled for by including country and year ￿xed e⁄ects.
Second, the setting of natural experiment (variation by a law change only applicable
to a treatment group exogenously chosen by demography) allows predictive power in
explaining an attitude, because the "treatability" is not systematically correlated either
with the other observable characteristics or with the measurement error of the attitude
variable.
Data on abortion laws are available in great detail from United Nations (2002).
Coding changes in contraception policies has proved more problematic. Contrary to
common expectations, data are hard to ￿nd. I have been able to collect somewhat
reliable data on the year that the contraceptive pill was embodied in national public
health policies, while I could not ￿nd data about the year that it was licensed in each
country. Because of these caveats, I give more weight to the analysis of abortion rights,
with a section on the possible in￿ uence of the pill.
4.2 Empirical strategy
4.2.1 Natural experiment
To evaluate the welfare e⁄ect of changes in abortion laws, a controlled experiment with
randomized data is not available, but several conditions let identify it as a natural ex-
periment. In the de￿nition of Besley and Case (2000), "a natural experiment is often
implicitly de￿ned as a law change that a⁄ects outcomes for identi￿able individuals who
are otherwise indistinguishable from those not directly a⁄ected by the law change. Nat-
11Answers have been recoded such that higher values re￿ ect higher life satisfaction.
10ural experiments thus have natural control groups with which to compare outcomes." As
long as the policy exhibits enough variation and it a⁄ects a random selection of individ-
uals, I can use it as a natural experiment. A classical concern when using law changes
to estimate di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences e⁄ects is that policies may be endogenous. In the
case of abortion laws, one would think that a common set of factors has motivated the
law changes. Surprisingly, it appears that there is not such a unifying theme underlying
legislation.
It is possible to show that there is no apparent link between the timing of abortion
legalisation and factors that could reasonably a⁄ect the timing of legislation. The can-
didates are being a Catholic (or Orthodox) country, having more or fewer women in
parliament, and the very measure of life satisfaction. The median year when countries
enacted laws of full abortion rights is 1981, which divides early from late adopters. In
table A.3 I separate countries for being above or below average life satisfaction (the
average is 2.04). A cross-tabulation along the two dimensions shows that laws granting
full abortion rights were equally spread in the four quadrants.
A cross-tabulation between the timing of adoption and the percentage of women
in parliament in the year that full abortion rights were enacted also shows no biased
pattern (table A.4). The same countries are equally spread out with regard to the
prevalent religion refusing abortion or not. Among the early adopters, are France and
Italy who are predominantly Catholic, and among the late adopters are Belgium and
Greece, who are predominantly Catholic and Orthodox. Moreover, the inclusion of a
country-speci￿c linear trend in all estimations should capture country-speci￿c trends in
attitudes towards women￿ s rights.
Finally, looking at the circumstances in which laws were passed shows di⁄erent in￿ u-
ences. Germany passed full rights as the outcome of a negotiation with the more liberal
East Germany￿ s legislation following the uni￿cation. In Greece, Spain and Portugal it
was a natural adaptation of the national corpus legis to the European one at the time
of the accession into the European Union (although it was not a required step, as the
opposite behaviour of Ireland shows). In Italy a Constitutional Court ruling opened the
way to a more open legislation.
Thus the idea that the timing of abortion legislation followed a very clear set of
motives, be them political or societal, is not supported in the data. Certainly these
changes did not happen in a vacuum, but what is important for the purpose of the
analysis is that none of the possible factors is a good predictor of the law changes.
In addition, from a more technical point of view, most changes in laws occurred in
the past and could not be a⁄ected by the dependent variable by way of reverse causation.
Table A.1 shows the timing. In 1967 the United Kingdom liberalised abortion. In the
1970s, Denmark, France and Italy legalised abortion on request and (West) Germany,
Greece and Luxembourg granted abortion rights on health grounds. In the 1980s the
11Netherlands and Greece extended full rights and Portugal and Spain granted rights
on health grounds. In the 1990s, Belgium and Germany extended rights to abortion on
request. Ireland is the only country that has never amended its outright ban on abortion.
Of the twelve countries in the sample, two, the UK and Denmark, extended full abortion
rights before the recording of life satisfaction by the Eurobarometer had started. For
three (Greece, Spain and Portugal), the Eurobarometer started to be collected only
following their later accession to the EU, which happened later than the policy change.
For the remaining six countries (leaving Ireland aside) the change in regime happened
directly during the time that life satisfaction is recollected. The temporal lag ensures
that there is no simultaneity between law changes and the recording of life satisfaction.
4.2.2 Di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences approach
Using treatment and control groups with di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences (DiD) over time allows
establishing a clean measure of the policy impact. Abortion rights are a group-speci￿c
policy that only a⁄ects individuals of a certain gender and age (i.e. women of childbearing
age). These factors are randomly allocated and individuals cannot self-select into the
policy. Knowing the individual characteristics of respondents, it is possible to identify
those who could be potentially treated (eligible). Matching this information with the
temporal and spatial variation of abortion policies in Europe naturally creates groups of
treated individuals ("treatment group") and groups of eligible but not treated individuals
("control group"). In addition, since the treated are observed both before and after
the treatment, it is possible to use the treated before the treatment as an additional
control group for the treated after the treatment. In terms of the literature on program
evaluation12, I estimate the average treatment e⁄ect on the treated (ATE1) , i.e. the
average di⁄erence between treated and untreated outcomes across the population and
over time within the same country.
The outcome variable, life satisfaction, does not show a systematic trend, as ￿gure
1 shows. Country-speci￿c linear and quadratic trends con￿rm this observation. Out of
twelve countries, ￿ve report not signi￿cant trends, four a positive one (Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Denmark, the Netherlands) and three a negative one (Belgium, Greece, Spain).
The treatment group comprises of women who were of childbearing age when abortion
legislation was enacted, and thus were exposed to the legislation when they could take
advantage of it. I do not use (nor have) information on whether women e⁄ectively
used abortion. I argue that the mere existence of abortion rights has made younger
generations more satis￿ed with their life, because of the lesser constraints imposed on
their life planning choices, even without exercising the option of using it. Thus it is the
combination of date of birth, gender and country of residence which jointly determine
whether each individual is exposed to the treatment. Since women interviewed are in
12See Abadie (2003), Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) and Wooldridge (2002).
12the age range of 15 to 99 years, I can infer from their date of birth whether during their
childbearing age they lived in an institutional setting allowing abortion. The combination
generates an exogenous source of identi￿cation that is present for all countries except
Ireland.
To illustrate the concept, let us set the end of childbearing age at 5013, and let us
take three women, all born in 1940, living in di⁄erent countries: the United Kingdom,
Italy and Belgium. Abortion rights were introduced respectively in 1967 in the UK, in
1978 in Italy and in 1990 in Belgium. The woman living in the United Kingdom was
27 in 1967 and she could plan much of her life with abortion rights. The woman living
in Italy was 38 when abortion was introduced in her country, so she could bene￿t from
the right￿ s extension for a shorter portion of her life (twelve years). Finally, the woman
in Belgium could not plan her life choices with abortion rights, because when abortion
was introduced in Belgium in 1990, the same woman was 50. Thus the treatment group
comprises women who were less than 50 when abortion rights were introduced, even if
at the time of the survey they were over 50. The fact that they could plan part of their
life under the regime with rights is what matters. For simplicity, these are de￿ned as
the "treatment group" throughout the analysis.
The principal control group is women who could not bene￿t from the rights either
because they were over childbearing age when the law changed or because, despite being
young, their country had not ruled in favour of abortion rights when they were inter-
viewed. These are labelled here "women control group". Distinguishing between these
two sub-groups does not yield signi￿cant di⁄erences, and therefore they are gathered in
the same group in most of the analysis. Table 7 presents the estimates when the two
groups are separated.
The individual nature of the data also allows to investigate whether men in the same
cohort of age as the treatment group (i.e. less than 50 years old when abortion rights
were introduced) were a⁄ected by the policy change. To the extent that they could be
the partners of the treatment group, this is not unreasonable, and the model has shown
that there could be an indirect e⁄ect through the marriage market.
Table A.5 reports summary statistics for baseline characteristics for individuals as-
signed to treatment and controls across all countries. The treatment and control groups
are relatively homogeneous. Means and standard deviations are similar, con￿rming ran-
dom assignment to the program across the population of the twelve European countries.
Any e⁄ect stemming from di⁄erent mean ages in the two groups is corrected by including
age ￿xed e⁄ects. Besides, age e⁄ects convey relevant information since they consistently
display a U-shaped trend with respect to reported life satisfaction, as per ￿gure 3. Other
personal characteristics apart from sex and age could in theory be a⁄ected by the treat-
13I follow the medical literature in setting the end of childbearing age at 50 years old. Robustness
checks in section 6 show that the results hold if an alternative age of 45 is adopted.
13ment, thereby introducing heterogeneity in the model, and are therefore not included.14
The fact that Western Europe is relatively homogeneous with regard to the actual
use of abortion rights ensures further comparability. Abortion is mainly used as a tool
of family and career planning, rather than as a means to control family size as among
married couples.15 Moreover, abortion is provided at a symbolic or null cost in all of
these countries16, eliminating concerns of rationing or budget constraints.
To estimate ATE1 with DiD one identifying assumption is needed.17 It states that
the average outcomes for treated and controls would have followed parallel paths over
time in the absence of the treatment. The absence of trends in the outcome variable,
life satisfaction, con￿rms this (see ￿gure 1).
Once the empirical strategy has been de￿ned, I can run reduced-form regressions of
the following form to test the key prediction of the model (proposition 3):
Wict = ￿1 ￿ Xct + ￿2 ￿ t1ict + ￿3 ￿ t2ict + ￿4 ￿ t3ict + ￿5 ￿ ￿ict +
+￿6 ￿ ￿c + ￿7 ￿ ￿t + ￿8 (￿c ￿ Y ear) + "ict (1)
where Wict denotes a four-category indicator of welfare of individual i living in country
c in year t, Xct is an indicator variable for living in a country that has extended legal
abortion rights at time t, t1ict is a dummy for belonging to the women treatment group,
t2ict comprises the women control group and t3ict the men control group.
The data structure is pooled cross-sections over time. Since observations are thus
independent but not identically distributed, standard errors are clustered by country and
year in all speci￿cations. This addresses concerns of aggregation bias (Moulton, 1990).
The results are consistent and robust when the model is estimated with standard errors
clustered by country only, in order to address another potential bias, that of potentially
serially correlated outcomes (Bertrand et al, 2003).
To control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, all regressions include age
e⁄ects, modelled as ten-year age dummies18 (￿ict); country e⁄ects (￿c) to capture time-
invariant di⁄erences between countries that passed such laws and those which did not;
14The data reassuringly show that the relationship of life satisfaction with personal characteristics
is consistent with the estimates by Blanch￿ ower and Oswald (2000) and Gardner and Oswald (2001),
which are based on other data.
15Henshaw (1990).
16David (1992).
17Underlying the estimation of ATE1 are two further assumptions: stable unit treatment value and
ignorability of treatment (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996). The ￿rst assumption rules out network
e⁄ects and implies that access to rights by one￿ s neighbours does not a⁄ect one￿ s observed outcome.
The assumption of ignorability of treatment requires that there is a random assignment of the treatment
to individuals, or that, conditional on the factors that determine treatment, observed outcomes are
independent of treatment itself. Here, once gender, age and country of residence are observed, an
individual cannot self-select herself in or out of the program.
18The results are robust to the inclusion of the continuous variables "age" and "age squared" instead
of cohort dummies.
14year e⁄ects (￿t) to control for general trends in extending abortion; a country-speci￿c
linear trend to allow country e⁄ects to change over time.
As the DiD estimator is unbiased only if the policy change is not systematically
related to other factors that a⁄ect life satisfaction, I investigate the possibility of omitted
variable bias by including other policies in favour of women: the inclusion of the pill
in programs of national public health, mutual consent divorce laws and the degree of
maternity bene￿ts.
Three further sources of information are used to understand the e⁄ects. These are
the variation in the spectrum of legislation from partial to full abortion rights, the insti-
tutional religious connotation of countries, which may have a⁄ected both the legislative
process and its reception, and religious attitudes and membership of individuals.19
A possible concern about the identi￿cation of the e⁄ect may arise from the movement
of people across countries, which could lead some women to have an abortion in countries
di⁄erent from those where they reside. If concrete, this possibility would induce a bias in
my estimates. An estimate of the size of these cross-border movements can be inferred
by the behaviour of Irish women. Ireland, where abortion is not legal, is neighboured by
the UK, where it has been legal since 1967. Despite the publicity surrounding it, it is
an opportunity that is costly both in terms of money, time and information needed, and
thus only available to a small fraction of the population. UK and Ireland are likely to
be the countries where this cost is lower, as the two countries share the same language,
which facilitates the collection of information to ￿ ow, and it is relatively cheap to travel
from one another. The Abortion Statistics published in the UK give numbers on abortion
by residents and non-residents. Between 1979 and 1999, a number between two and six
thousand women per year (0.4 to 0.7 percent of women in Ireland) had an abortion in
England. These amounted to only 3.4 percent of all abortions undertaken in England.
Moreover, it is important to remember that this would not a⁄ect the direction of my
estimates. It would actually induce a downward bias in my estimates, which would then
provide a lower bound for the e⁄ect.
All regressions have been run both as an ordered probit and as a linear probability
model (LPM). Since the categories of the dependent variable are interpretable as ordi-
nal, but not cardinal, the coe¢ cients from the ordered probit model are more correct
than those from OLS. On the other hand marginal e⁄ects are more di¢ cult to report
parsimoniously in the case of a four-outcome variable. The linear probability model has
the advantage that reporting and interpreting marginal e⁄ects is more straightforward.
Angrist (2000) shows that if the focus is on directly interpretable causal e⁄ects rather
than on structural parameters, the two approaches are largely comparable.
In this paper I report both sets of results for the main speci￿cation of the model in
19It would also be interesting to analyse the relative variation in the actual use of abortion, but o¢ cial
statistics are non comparable, as France, Germany and Italy adopt di⁄erent reporting methods than
other European countries.
15tables 1 and 2. Since they are totally consistent, table 3 and the following ones report
estimates from the linear probability model only.
5 Main results
5.1 The welfare e⁄ect of abortion laws on women
Table 1 reports the estimates of the e⁄ect of abortion rights on life satisfaction from
the linear probability model. Each column estimates the e⁄ect on di⁄erent sets of treat-
ment and control groups. By choosing control groups that are directly comparable with
the treatment group, the coe¢ cient on the treatment group yields the di⁄erences-in-
di⁄erences estimate of the welfare gain (￿2 in equation 1). All regressions control for
age, country and year e⁄ects, a country-speci￿c linear trend, and cluster the errors on
country and year to obtain robust standard errors. The F-tests on each set of controls,
including ￿xed e⁄ects, reject throughout all regressions that they could be jointly null.
The table reports the p-value of F-tests on the equality of the relevant coe¢ cients at the
bottom.
Column 1 shows the general result that women report on average more welfare than
men, consistently with the previous literature.20 Column 2 separates women by whether
they lived with abortion rights when of childbearing age (treatment group) or not (con-
trol group). The control group includes women who did not bene￿t from these rights,
either because they were not of childbearing age anymore, or because their country had
not passed abortion laws at the time they were surveyed. The estimated coe¢ cients
show that women in the treatment group systematically report higher levels of life sat-
isfaction than the rest of the population. This is not true of other women, who report a
negative, not signi￿cant coe¢ cient.21 A Wald test on the estimated di⁄erence between
the treatment and control group of women is signi￿cant.
Comparing the estimated coe¢ cient with those obtained on personal characteristics
(income level, work status, level of education, marital status), it appears that the magni-
tude of the welfare gain from abortion rights is equivalent to the increase in welfare from
moving one level upwards on a 12-category scale of income, which is largely constant
along the income scale. It is also equivalent to the e⁄ect of having higher rather than
middle education. It is smaller (around one seventh) than the corresponding welfare loss
from being unemployed or separated.
Column 3 de￿nes a control group of men who were in the same cohort of age as women
in the treatment group. These are directly comparable to women in the treatment group
20See Blanch￿ ower and Oswald (2003).
21Estimates of the same speci￿cation where the control group of women is broken down between
women who did not enjoy abortion rights because of their age and those whose country did not provide
abortion rights are reported in table 7. They show that there is no di⁄erence in the welfare of the two
groups.
16for being at same stage of the life cycle, while they may di⁄er for gender e⁄ects. The
estimates are consistent with the previous speci￿cation. Men who lived under abortion
rights when they were less than 50 years old do not show any signi￿cant di⁄erence with
respect to other men. Women in the treatment group are on average signi￿cantly more
satis￿ed than other women, than men of the same age, and than men who did not live
under abortion rights. The di⁄erence in these e⁄ects is statistically signi￿cant.
Column 4 reports a control experiment. The previous results could in principle be the
outcome of a cohort e⁄ect, whereby younger women are simply more satis￿ed than older
ones. Since all regressions control for age e⁄ects, this is unlikely, but it is worthwhile to
do a counter-experiment to formally check for this possibility. In column 4 I identify a
"false" treatment group made of women who were younger than 50 years old at the time
of the survey. They do not appear signi￿cantly more satis￿ed than other women.
Columns 5 and 6 investigate whether the treatment e⁄ect has been constant at the
various ages at which women received abortion rights. Since younger women face a longer
horizon over which to reap the bene￿ts of education and fertility planning, the e⁄ect of
birth control rights should be stronger, the younger women are when the rights are
introduced. If instead the positive e⁄ect of abortion rights is merely one of psychological
empowerment from having more individual rights, this e⁄ect should be constant at any
age. Column 5 reveals that the largest part of the positive welfare e⁄ect is indeed on
women who received abortion rights when they were less than 35 years old. Women who
received abortion rights while between 35 and 50 years old do not signi￿cantly report
more welfare than the rest of the population. This is consistent with an e⁄ect going
through better life planning of investment in education and desired fertility as the one
spelt out in the model, more than with a psychological empowerment of women.
In an alternative speci￿cation, column 6 de￿nes the treatment group by the number
of years that a woman lived under abortion rights while of childbearing age. Both a
linear and a quadratic term are introduced. The estimates show that having lived under
abortion rights for longer has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on women￿ s welfare, albeit
at a decreasing rate.
Finally, column 7 provides estimates of the same speci￿cation as in column 2, with
standard errors clustered on country only. This is a more restrictive condition imposed
on the data. Although the individual level identi￿cation strongly reduces the year-
to-year autocorrelation of the law regime, the latter could induce an overstatement of
the signi￿cance of the e⁄ects. The estimates when clustering on country con￿rms a
signi￿cantly higher welfare for women in the treatment group.
In all regressions, the estimated e⁄ect of having abortion rights at the time of the
survey is positive and signi￿cant. This points to a consistent increase in the average
level of satisfaction in countries and times with abortion rights, analogously to a general
public good. This is independent of the private bene￿ts at the individual level. The
17breakdown of this societal e⁄ect is investigated in section 6.6. If it were negative, it
could indicate a strong aversion to birth control laws. As it is positive, one possible
interpretation is that people enjoy living in a society that grants more individual rights.
Another possibility is that birth control rights brought a change in social norms that
made everyone more satis￿ed. By allowing women individual rights on their fertility,
and indirectly on choices of family and work, various social norms broke up. Previously
"unconventional" choices became socially acceptable, both for men and women. Akerlof
and Kranton (2000)￿ s model of identity would argue at this point that utility increased
because the reference point for social roles shifted closer to "unconventional" identities.
Table 2, columns 1 to 3, presents the ordered probit estimates and the marginal
e⁄ects. These are consistent with those from the linear probability model both in terms
of size and direction of the e⁄ects. Column 1 con￿rms that women report on average
more welfare than men. Column 2 show that this e⁄ect is deriving from women in the
treatment group, i.e. who lived with abortion rights at the time they were of childbearing
age. This set of women reports to be "very satis￿ed" with 1.5 percentage points higher
probability, while it has a negative probability to report lower levels of life satisfaction.
Women in the control group have not been a⁄ected signi￿cantly. Column 3 con￿rm
these results and adds that men of the same age as women in the treatment group were
not a⁄ected signi￿cantly either.
To sum, the main result that emerges from these regressions is that, with the in-
troduction of abortion rights, women who were able to incorporate abortion rights in
their life planning experienced an increase in welfare. The rest of the population, and in
particular other women who could not bene￿t from the rights, did not experience any
e⁄ect. The e⁄ect is stronger, the younger the women were when abortion rights were
introduced, and the longer the planning horizon they faced. Marginal returns start to
decline after the woman is 35 years old. The possibility of a spurious correlation from
women being happier than men and young women being happier than older women is
ruled out by the results of a control experiment. All e⁄ects are signi￿cant over and above
those of country and year ￿xed e⁄ects, country trends, and individual age a⁄ects.
6 Extensions
In this section the basic model is extended in various directions to take account of
possible elements of heterogeneity and econometric concerns. The next section reviews
the consistency of results on life satisfaction with the economic outcomes predicted by
the formal model in section 3. Section 6.2 gives an ex-post description of who gained
and who lost from these policies. Sections 6.3 reviews how other policies in favour of
women￿ s rights a⁄ect the analysis. Section 6.4 deals with variations in treatment e⁄ects
along religious lines. Sections 6.5 addresses concerns of endogenous legislation. Section
186.6 presents a series of robustness checks and sensitivity analysis and ￿nally, section 6.7
describes how the societal e⁄ect of the policy is distributed among the population.
6.1 Consistency with the economic model
The richness of individual level data is that it is possible to systematically match what
individuals declare about their preferences with their personal characteristics and their
life choices, such as education and work. This approach allows a "revealed preference"
test of whether the model outlined in section 3 is consistent with the data.
In particular, I explore the validity of proposition 1 from the model. It states that
with birth control rights, holding the level of individual skills constant, men￿ s optimal
investment in education does not change, while women￿ s optimal investment is larger or
equal than without rights. The same is expected to hold for income. Therefore I run
three sets of regressions with a parallel design to equation 1 and columns 1 to 3 in table
1. The explanatory variables in the three cases are the same as in the main equation:
abortion rights, a control for being a woman, the treatment and control groups, ￿xed
e⁄ects and the country-speci￿c linear trend, with errors clustered on country and year.
In the ￿rst set, I run a probit where the dependent variable is a dummy for receiving
higher education (i.e. ￿nishing school after 20 years old). Here the threshold age for
bene￿ting of abortion rights and changing one￿ s investment in higher education is set to
20 years old, for consistency between the timing of opportunities and choices. Column
1 shows that being a woman decreases the marginal probability of attaining higher edu-
cation by 5.5 percentage points, but column 2 reveals that this probability improves for
women in the treatment group relative to women in the control group (-4.1 percentage
points versus -5.6 percentage points, respectively). This di⁄erence is statistically signif-
icant. A further breakdown of women in the control group (not reported in the table)
highlights that women who received abortion rights but when they had completed their
fertility cycle have a higher probability to attain a higher level of education than women
who lived in countries with no abortion rights. Column 3 con￿rms these results and
adds that men who lived in a country with abortion rights when less than twenty years
old show a lower probability to achieve higher education as much as "treated" women,
in a result that is di¢ cult to explain in the framework adopted.
In the second set (columns 4 to 6), I run a probit for the e⁄ect of access to abortion
rights on the probability of working. In this and in the last set I use the usual threshold
age of 50 years old to de￿ne treatment and control groups. Women in general have 35.8
percentage points lower probability to be working than men (column 4). This probability
reduces to 32.3 in the treatment group and 37.8 percentage points in the control group
when they are disaggregated (column 5). Once the men treatment group is controlled
for, in column 6, it appears that men who were less than ￿fty when abortion rights
were introduced have 8.2 percentage point higher probability to be working than other
19men, women in the treatment group have 26 percentage points lower probability, and
the remaining women have 36.3 points lower probability. The better outcome of men
exposed to abortion rights relative to other men is again explained as the result of a
more e¢ cient process of resource allocation. As in the previous set of regressions, when
women in the control group are broken down in two subgroups, women who received
abortion rights when they had completed their fertility cycle have a higher probability
to be working than women who lived in a country with no abortion rights (not reported
in the table). This points to the fact that the discrepancy between women with and
without abortion rights is much less due to a cohort e⁄ect than expected.
The third and last set (columns 7 to 9) takes the twelve-category classi￿cation of
personal income as the dependent variable and runs a linear probability model on the
e⁄ect of abortion rights. Women are more likely to end up in lower classes of the income
ranking (column 7). Women in the treatment group show consistently better outcomes
than other women (column 8), but worse ones compared to men, in particular to men of
their same age (column 9). As with the probability of working, "treated" men exhibit a
higher income than other men, which points to a higher e¢ ciency of resource allocation
in these countries.
The empirical results are tightly consistent with Proposition 1 of the model, which
asserts that abortion rights should raise female investment in education and female
income. According to the estimates, women in general report a lower probability than
men to achieve higher education, to work and to receive a higher income, respectively
by 5.5, 35.8 and 50.8 percentage points. Women who had access to abortion rights when
they were "young enough" to a⁄ect their choices of education and work consistently
show an improvement in this probability with respect to all women, but yet a lower
probability compared to men.
Men in the control group who lived in countries with abortion rights report a lower
investment in education, while in theory no signi￿cant changes would be expected. This
result is likely to deserve some more investigation. At the same time, men in the control
group report an increased probability to work and they tend to receive a higher income.
This can be explained as the result of a more e¢ cient allocation of resources in these
countries once individual rights to women are granted.
6.2 The distribution of gains and losses
Table 4 gives a descriptive, not causal, representation of which categories of women
within the treatment group have gained or lost from the institutional change, according
to their education level, working and marital status. The impact of the ability to control
fertility on life planning and welfare may vary depending on individual skills, wages,
education levels and marital status.
I do not claim causality between life satisfaction and the various indicators of marital
20status, level of education, type of occupation, on the grounds that these choices may
be largely endogenous to the set of abortion rights available, as the model illustrates.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see which categories of women seem to have gained the
most welfare.
Women who are married or cohabiting, women who work and women with high edu-
cation have gained the most in terms of life satisfaction. Women who have also gained,
although in a ratio of one-￿fth compared to those who work. Women of childbearing
age who are single, have low education and/or do not work, have a lower welfare than
average, and show a lower life satisfaction than the average.
This gives an instant picture of the sides of the debate on the e⁄ect of women￿ s rights
on women￿ s welfare. Women who could "have it all" give the highest evaluation of their
welfare, while women who have lower skills or education and women who could not ￿nd
a match in the marriage market give the lowest.
6.3 Other policies in favour of women
It is important to analyse whether the legalisation of abortion proxies for some other pol-
icy that occurred at the same time and a⁄ected women of childbearing age in particular.
Alternatively, there could be some underlying factor a⁄ecting both abortion rights and
individual life satisfaction at the same time. Other policies in favour of women￿ s rights
are natural candidates for these possibilities. Although the varied timing of abortion
rights gives some protection against the likelihood that another factor exactly mimicked
their pattern, I investigate this possibility.
I consider three policies that may have a⁄ected women di⁄erently than men: the
inclusion of the pill in programs of national public policies, no-fault divorce laws and the
provision of maternity leave.
Table A.1 shows that the ￿rst two sets of laws were legalised in European countries in
a staggered manner over the period 1960s-1990s, although with a marked di⁄erent timing
across countries from that of abortion. Maternity leave protection increased markedly
between 1969 and 1994, with a large jump at the end of the 1970s (Ruhm, 1998). This
absence of synchronisation weakens the possibility that the e⁄ect of abortion rights is
overlapping with that of another policy.
The pill was invented in the late 1950s and marketed for the ￿rst time in the US
in 1960. With another staggered timing over 1960s-1990s it was embodied in European
countries￿public policies and provided by the national health systems.22 The pill has
put women more in control of their fertility. Although contraception has always existed,
"promoted as almost 100 per cent e⁄ective, the pill altered people￿ s expectations about
contraception and what it would achieve" (Marks, 2001). Its availability as part of the
22As mentioned earlier, data on the coverage of the pill by national public policies are less precise,
making estimates less reliable. This is why the analysis does not focus more directly on this change.
21nationally ￿nanced public system meant that precise information became available to
all women and that they could have access to it regardless of age, marital status, and
￿nancial constraints. Thus, for the same reasons of abortion rights, it may have increased
women￿ s life satisfaction.
No-fault, or mutual consent, divorce laws made the position of women equal to that
of men in the event of a divorce. By removing a constraint on the choice of women, they
should have increased their life satisfaction. On the other hand, since the existence of
divorce is associated with being able to renege on a previous choice, its welfare e⁄ects
may also be negative. Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) point out some of these
ambiguous e⁄ects of marital instability on utility maximisation. If marriage is a contract
with various non-contractible elements, making easier to break it leads the couple to be
"reluctant to invest in skills or commodities speci￿c to their marriage if they anticipate
dissolution: having children and working exclusively in the nonmarket sector are two
such marriage-related activities" (Becker et al, 1977). Less time and fewer resources
invested both in the search phase and in the marriage itself eventually lead to a utility
from marriage which is lower at the time of dissolution than that expected at the time of
marriage. Following these considerations, the expectation on the e⁄ect of having more
divorce possibilities may as well be negative.
For maternity protection policies, I have data covering 1969 through 1994. Of the
countries in my sample, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Italy have made
signi￿cant changes to their legislation. Ruhm (1998, 2000) has collected data that allow
to compute the number of "full-pay" weeks of leave as the product of the number of weeks
of paid leave (distinguishing between job-protected leave and not) by the average wage
replacement rate. I examine how bene￿ting from long full-pay maternity leave (where
long means "above the average") interacts with abortion rights. In principle, women
who bene￿t from great maternity protection do not need abortion rights to optimally
plan their education and work choices, as children do not limit the earning possibilities
and working time of the women.23 If this substitutability were perfect, an interaction of
maternity policies and abortion rights would exhibit a zero estimated coe¢ cient.
Table 5 reports the results for the three sets of policies. As before, all regressions
control for age, country and year e⁄ects, include a country-speci￿c linear trend, and
standard errors are obtained from clustering the errors on country and year. The ￿rst
column includes abortion, pill, divorce and maternity policies to evaluate the e⁄ect of
abortion rights over and above them. Columns 2 and 3 report results for the role of the
pill and mutual consent divorce changes a⁄ecting the life satisfaction of people exposed
to them. Column 4 reports results on the interaction of abortion rights and maternity
policies. Treatment and control groups are re-computed in an analogous way as with
23Women are expected to bear the main impact of maternal leave changes, as even where parental
leave applies equally to fathers, it is mothers who take the majority of the leave (95%).
22abortion rights.
The regression in column 1 includes four policies and the groups of individuals who
were a⁄ected by them: abortion rights, the pill as part of public policy, mutual divorce
laws and high maternity leave protection. The estimate of the e⁄ect of abortion rights
remain remarkably very close to those found in previous speci￿cations. The low sensi-
tivity of the abortion coe¢ cients to the inclusion of additional variables suggests that
the problem of collinearity is very low. Over and above the e⁄ect of divorce laws, the
pill and maternity leave, extending abortion rights has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of
increasing life satisfaction. Women bene￿ting from no-fault divorce laws instead report
a signi￿cantly lower life satisfaction. Women having access to the pill within the frame-
work of national public policies are signi￿cantly more satis￿ed. The positive e⁄ect of the
pill is not statistically distinguishable from that of abortion rights, as expected, while
the e⁄ect of abortion and divorce right is. Having higher maternity leave protection does
not a⁄ect life satisfaction signi￿cantly.
Columns 2 and 3 show that the pill and divorce laws taken alone have the same e⁄ect
as when they are taken all together. This is further evidence of the low multicollinearity
of the e⁄ects.
The e⁄ect of the pill is reported in column 2. It is negative and signi￿cant in its
valuation as a public good, but women who had access to it while of childbearing age
report a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on their welfare. The di⁄erence between the
private and public bene￿t is statistically signi￿cant. The fact that, in general, the pill
anticipated the extension of abortion rights points to a cumulative e⁄ect of the two
policies.
The e⁄ect of no-fault divorce is positive and signi￿cant in general but negative and
signi￿cant e⁄ect on women (column 3) . This is consistent with the conventional eco-
nomic approach to divorce by Becker et al (1977).
High maternity protection policies appear not to have a⁄ected life satisfaction, nei-
ther per se, nor on the group of women who bene￿ted from them during childbearing
age (column 4).
Column 5 examines the further possibility of interaction of abortion rights with
maternity leave policies. As outlined before, it may be that countries providing excellent
maternity leave, i.e. for long enough periods and with a replacement wage rate close to
unity, make the event of having a child, even if unplanned, neutral with respect to the
woman￿ s decision to study for higher education and work. With such a well designed
maternity leave, abortion rights would be super￿ uous, unless there is a taste for planning
the timing and spacing of children.24 The results show that once the interaction of the
two factors is allowed, maternity leave per se becomes signi￿cant in increasing general
24Here I am abstracting from incentive e⁄ects on labour supply as well as demand, i.e. disincentives
for ￿rms to hire women of childbearing age.
23welfare, but there are no speci￿c e⁄ects stemming from the interaction of maternity
protection and abortion rights. The positive e⁄ect of having abortion rights on the
women treatment group is robust to this test. Although the coe¢ cient is not signi￿cant,
the fact that it is negative may weakly suggest that the two policies acted as relative
substitutes. The same results are obtained using di⁄erent components of maternity
protection, such as the wage replacement rate, the number of weeks of job-protected
leave and the number of non protected ones.
Another possible factor a⁄ecting the life satisfaction of women could be technological
progress, which decreased the e⁄ort required to perform most tasks, including household
tasks. If it took one day and a lot of e⁄ort to do the washing in the 1930s, it now
takes an hour and very little e⁄ort to do it with a washing machine. I would expect
this e⁄ect to happen both for men and women, as it is not con￿ned to household tasks.
This can be proxied by a country-speci￿c linear time trend, which has been controlled
for throughout the whole analysis. Therefore, results should be interpreted as over and
above the e⁄ort-saving e⁄ect of technological progress.
Regarding the possibility that it has been "feminism" that has driven both women￿ s
life satisfaction and the passing of laws liberalizing abortion, I prefer to give an empirical
content to feminism as that of parity laws. Any other de￿nition of feminism is not
observationally distinguishable from that of a general or country-speci￿c linear trend.
On this Becker (1981, p. 251) argues "the [women￿ s] movement is primarily a response
to other forces that have dramatically changed the role of women rather than a major
independent force in changing their role."
6.3.1 Individual religiosity information as a test for omitted variable bias
A di⁄erent approach to investigate the possibility of an omitted variable bias is to look
at the e⁄ect of abortion rights on women who may be personally opposed to use abortion
on religious grounds. Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Orthodox Jewish and Muslim religions
explicitly ban abortion in all instances. Women who are strongly attached to these reli-
gions are subject to all women￿ s rights in￿ uences experienced by the general treatment
group, but they are likely not to derive any personal bene￿t from laws allowing abor-
tion. If they do not exhibit higher life satisfaction, while the rest of the treated women
does, this is additional evidence of the causality of abortion rights in increasing welfare.
Therefore, in the framework of a wider analysis on religious e⁄ects, I single out women
in the treatment group according to which denomination they regard themselves as be-
longing to. Column 4 in table 6 shows that treated women (i.e. who had abortion rights
while of childbearing age) who de￿ne themselves as Greek Orthodox or Jewish are not
any more satis￿ed than the rest of the population. Muslim women report a lower welfare
than the average. Catholic women instead report a higher welfare. This is consistent
with the literature on the sociology of religion, which argues that on the issue of family
24planning Catholic women have disassociated themselves from the doctrine, even when
strongly religious.
In general, this regression con￿rms that women who live in countries with abortion
rights and are in childbearing age, but cannot make individual use of these rights because
of their beliefs or the community they belong to, have not experienced any change in
welfare. At the most, it has reduced it. This calls back into play the theory of Akerlof,
Yellen and Katz (1996), when they argue that "women who, because of indecision or
religious conviction have failed to adopt these innovations, have lost disproportionately".
This result may be a valid proof that the e⁄ects found so far truly stem from birth control
rights and not from some omitted underlying variable.
6.4 Variations in treatment e⁄ects by religion
Religious institutions
So far the analysis has assumed that the average treatment e⁄ect of extending abor-
tion rights is the same across all countries. In reality, the e⁄ect of the treatment may
di⁄er across institutional settings.
This could be the case with religious institutions in Europe, in countries where they
are predominant and they may interact with public policy. Europe has a strong Christian
in￿ uence in its institutions, roughly equally divided between the Roman Catholic and the
Protestant versions of Christianity. Other religious groups are quantitatively important,
but they have had less impact on the institutional framework of European countries.
The two Christian churches have taken a di⁄erent stance on abortion. The Roman
Catholic Church sees abortion as a crime with no exception and anybody who has
or facilitates an abortion is punished with excommunication from the Church. The
Protestant Church (at least in my understanding) has not taken a formal stance on
abortion and leaves it up to the individual and the couple to regulate this aspect of their
life "according to their conscience". The Church of England shares the same approach25.
Therefore it is predominantly Roman Catholic countries that have a more polarised view
within society of reproductive freedom. They may comprise of non-religious people who
abide to the laws of the state, Catholics who abide to the Catholic Church law and
Catholics who despite their religion choose to only abide to the state laws on this issue. It
is interesting to analyse whether this polarised stance has induced systematic di⁄erences
in the e⁄ects of abortion laws in countries where one or the other religion dominates.
Concerns about whether the Catholic church has retarded the timing or the content of
laws instead do not hold, as predominately Catholic countries are equally present among
early adopters (France, Italy), as among late adopters (Belgium, Greece) in granting full
rights, i.e. abortion on demand (see table A.3).
25See Brookes (1988, p. 154) for a description of the attitude of the Church of England.
25To explore the extent of heterogeneous e⁄ects, columns 1 and 2 in table 6 run the
basic speci￿cation separating countries that are predominantly Catholic from the others.
The latter usually comprise a large share of Protestants, but not only, so I label them
"non-predominantly Catholic"26.
The two sets of countries show some di⁄erences in e⁄ects. In non-Catholic countries,
women in the treatment group experienced a sizeable increase in welfare with respect to
the rest of the population. Nevertheless, the general e⁄ect of having abortion rights at
the time of the survey has a negative impact on reported welfare.
In Catholic countries instead, neither the treatment group, nor the control groups
report a signi￿cant variation in welfare through abortion rights. There is instead a
positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect from abortion rights in general.
This points to the concrete possibility that the Catholic church may have hindered
the application of abortion laws or the realisation of their e⁄ects. In Catholic countries,
where women achieved economic and political rights much later than in non-Catholic
countries, prevailing social norms may have constrained the full e⁄ects of abortion laws
on individual behaviour, and thus the life satisfaction associated with these choices. Put
simply, women may have had individual birth control rights, but individual rights proved
less e⁄ective when embedded in a culture where women had not achieved a social identity
di⁄erent from her role in the household. An opposite but consistent explanation is
instead that the breakup in social norms was so large in Catholic countries that everyone
bene￿ted from it. It is not possible to distinguish between the two interpretations yet.
Individual religiosity
In table 6, columns 3 and 4, I analyse the possibility that the religious beliefs of the
individual a⁄ect the extent to which she bene￿ts from birth control rights.
Somewhat surprisingly, column 3 shows that women in the treatment group who
declare themselves to "feel religious" report an additional positive, signi￿cant e⁄ect on
welfare from birth control rights compared to the rest of the population. Using alterna-
tive indicators of religiosity, like religious attendance and the importance of religion in
one￿ s life, does not change this result in any way.
In column 4, women in the treatment group who declare themselves as belonging to
a Catholic or a Protestant (including "Other Protestant") denomination report higher
welfare. Greek Orthodox and Jewish women report respectively a positive and a negative
sign, but these are not signi￿cant. Muslim women report a lower welfare. As these
religions all strongly oppose abortion, these results have been interpreted in the previous
section as the result of adhering to a religion that denies the validity of abortion, despite
living in a country that allows it. Abortion rights have improved the welfare of women
26The countries classi￿ed as predominantly Catholic are Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland,
Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Non-predominantly Catholic countries in the sample are the Netherlands,
Germany, Denmark, and United Kingdom.
26who were in an age when they could adopt them, but actual individual access to these
rights is the joint outcome of country laws and the relative freedom granted by the
religious denomination one wants to belong to. Catholic women represent an anomaly,
as they report increased life satisfaction in spite of the fact that the doctrine bans
abortion. Nevertheless, it is documented in the sociological literature that on issues of
reproductive rights, even the most fervent Catholic women have adopted a stance of
independence from the doctrine.
6.5 Robustness checks
Table 7 reports a number of robustness checks on the main result that women who could
bene￿t from abortion rights report a higher evaluation of their own welfare.
Breakdown of control group of women
Throughout the analysis I consider the di⁄erence in di⁄erence e⁄ect on treated women
with respect to women who could not bene￿t from the rights either because they were
over childbearing age when the law changed or because, despite being young, their
country had not ruled in favour of abortion rights when they were interviewed. Column
1 presents the estimates when the two groups are separated. It appears that women who
lived in countries without abortion rights have a change in welfare with a coe¢ cient of
0.055; women who did live in a country and year with abortion rights, but when they
had completed their fertility cycle, have a coe¢ cient of 0.061 (=0.118-0.057). Since the
two e⁄ects are very close, it makes sense to group the two sets of women together, as
this simpli￿es the interpretation of the di⁄erence in di⁄erence coe¢ cients.
"False" vs. "true" law changes
Given the depth of information on abortion laws, I can identify a set countries where
the law change was less e⁄ective in practice. United Nations (2002) states that before the
law was changed, Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands were known to have widespread
underground abortion and not to enforce the ban. Indeed, a regression of the basic
model on these three countries shows no signi￿cant e⁄ect of abortion on women both
in the treatment and control group (column 2). On countries where the law change
was e⁄ective (column 3), instead, the basic model yields the traditional prediction of a
positive e⁄ect on the treatment group.
This regression also shows a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on men in the same cohort
of age as the women treatment group. This may point at a more precise e⁄ect on men,
possibly going through marriage market e⁄ects, as indicated by the model in section 3.
Heterogeneity of rights
Over the years, the legislation on abortion rights has sometimes granted "partial
rights", i.e. the right to abortion for health concerns relating either to the woman or to
the child, including in the de￿nition both physical and mental health, and other times
27"full rights", i.e. the right to abort on socio-economic grounds or simply on request.27
Some countries have granted partial rights only, others have later moved to full rights,
others have leaped directly from no rights to full rights. Table A.1 gives details of the
timeline of changes. Table 7, column 4 examines whether the e⁄ects of partial or full
rights of abortion are di⁄erent.
It appears that extending partial or full rights had a similar positive e⁄ect on women
who could make use of these rights. The general e⁄ect on society of having abortion
rights at the time of the survey is larger with partial rights than with full rights, but the
two are not statistically di⁄erent.
These e⁄ects are consistent with the commentaries of researchers on abortion. They
observe that the leap to partial rights often opens some loophole or room for manoeuvre
to obtain full rights in practice.28 Once abortion is seen as a socially acceptable course
of action and some rights are allowed for, arguments for abortion can be extended by the
administering doctor to wider social considerations. In particular, doctors may authorise
abortion for socio-economic reasons under the "mental health" protection ground of the
woman.
One year before and one year after the law change
In column 5, I extract a sub-sample where the panel dimension is reduced to one year
before and one after the law change for countries where the law changed between 1975
and 1998. This amounts to a much smaller sample of around 22,000 people. Despite the
restrictiveness of the condition, the positive e⁄ect on the treatment group is signi￿cant
and robust.
The duration of the welfare e⁄ect
Column 6 explores the possibility that results hinge on the "euphoria" e⁄ect imme-
diately after the legalisation. Therefore I eliminate observations corresponding to the
year when abortion was legalised and the following ￿ve years. Yet the positive e⁄ect
on women who could use these rights is present even six years after their introduction,
demonstrating a lasting feature.
Sensitivity analysis on the threshold age for end of childbearing
In column 7, I check the sensitivity of results to the choice of the threshold for the
end of childbearing age. In the course of the analysis I have adopted 50 years of age
as this is the limit usually adopted in the medical literature. The results are robust to
adopting an age of 45 years.
Removing the autocorrelation of laws
There is the possibility that since the adoption of laws is positively serially correlated
over time, the results on abortion rights at the time of the survey could have standard
errors which are biased downwards (Bertrand et al, 2003). However, this would only
27For details, see Appendix 1.
28This is often argued in the case of Spain nowadays, which only grants partial rights, but where
abortion is e⁄ectively available on demand in private clinics.
28a⁄ect the validity of the estimates of the societal e⁄ect of abortion. The estimate of the
private bene￿t is derived from an individual level, cross-sectional identi￿cation and does
not su⁄er from this bias.
The fact that all regressions cluster the observations on the country and year they
were drawn from provides a powerful control for this possibility. Further checks using
clustering on country in table 1 have reassured about the robustness of the identi￿cation
to this bias.
As a further robustness exercise, I test for the possibility of under-rejection of the
correct model by two di⁄erent approaches. In one approach, as Bertrand et al suggest, I
ignore the time series information and regress the dependent variable (individual welfare)
on all relevant covariates and ￿xed e⁄ects employed in the estimation, except for the law
change. The estimated residuals from the treatment countries only are divided among
those corresponding to before and after the law and are regressed on the law dummy in
a two-period panel. The results are shown in column 8. The e⁄ect of the law itself is
positive and strongly signi￿cant. This may be a con￿rmation that the e⁄ect of abortion
rights goes both through private e⁄ects on the individual, as well as through general or
public good e⁄ects.
Selection e⁄ect, or "Donohue and Levitt e⁄ect"
Donohue and Levitt (2001) argue that the crime rate in the United States has declined
signi￿cantly around 18 years after the legalisation of abortion, and that there is a causal
relationship between the two events. Taken to the extreme, this argument could suggest
that the results shown above may depend on fewer unhappy or unlucky people being born
over time in countries allowing abortion, and thus to an increase in life satisfaction in
these countries. When I subtract from the sample individuals born after abortion rights
were introduced in each country, the positive e⁄ect of abortion rights on the treatment
group is robust to this exclusion (regression not reported here).
6.6 Societal e⁄ects of the introduction of abortion rights
All previous results show a positive e⁄ect of living in a country with abortion rights on the
evaluation of personal life satisfaction, with the only exception of Protestant countries.
This parameter reveals a general e⁄ect that goes beyond whether the individual can
actually make use of these rights. We would expect individuals who strongly oppose
these rights to report a negative value of the estimated coe¢ cient.
Table 8 investigates whether there is any systematic e⁄ect from personal covariates
(age, gender, religion) on individual life satisfaction. The table reports seven sets of
regressions of life satisfaction on a dummy for abortion rights at the time of the survey,
alone and interacted with the relevant covariates. Each set of rows between thick lines
represents a di⁄erent regression. All regressions control for the individual being in the
women treatment group or in the two control groups of men and women, for all ￿xed
29e⁄ects and the trend. The third column reports the coe¢ cient on the interaction, while
the fourth column shows the estimated coe¢ cient on abortion rights.
The ￿ndings are that man derive large marginal bene￿ts from living in a country
with abortion rights, while women in general do not (set 1). The bene￿ts on women
are concentrated only on those who could actually make use of abortion rights, and are
therefore in the domain of private e⁄ects (set 2). The age of respondents does not have
a signi￿cant e⁄ect over and above that of general age e⁄ects (set 3). Only individuals
younger than 20 years old report a higher consideration of abortion rights.
In terms of political self-placement, left-wing individuals give surprisingly the lowest
evaluation of their life satisfaction in presence of abortion rights and right-wing individ-
uals give the highest (set 4).
Religious individuals are more positive towards abortion (set 5), relatively religious
men more than religious women (set 6). Protestant and Catholics also show a positive
general e⁄ect from living in a country with abortion rights, while the e⁄ect is negative
for Muslim and neutral for Greek Orthodox and Jewish (set 7).
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have explored the issue of whether women￿ s rights have brought women
a higher welfare and satisfaction with their lives. I have focused my analysis on birth
control rights. The e⁄ect of a change in birth control rights on welfare could operate
through (at least) three di⁄erent channels: through a reduction in unwanted children,
through a better planning of education choices for women and through a more general
empowerment of women. Although all three channels are likely to be relevant in practice,
the one that operates through the optimal investment in education is explored in more
detail as it lends itself to predictions that can be tested by quantitative analysis.
I have analysed the evaluations of life satisfaction by over 450,000 individuals in
twelve European countries between 1975 and 1998. Both abortion rights and the en-
dorsement of the pill by national public policies were introduced with a staggered and
plausibly exogenous timing between 1967 and the 1990s. I have linked gender, birth year
and country of residence of the individual in a unique framework aimed at determin-
ing whether the individual could be a⁄ected by birth control rights, or in other words,
was treated. The di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences framework has yielded a clean estimate of
the e⁄ect of birth control rights on individual welfare, in particular on that of women.
The richness of data allowed to disentangle the welfare e⁄ect deriving from birth control
rights from possibly confounding e⁄ects such as gender and age e⁄ects, e⁄ects due to
the country and the year the person lives in, and to general trends within the country.
The main ￿nding is that following abortion rights, women who were e⁄ectively ex-
posed to the policy (i.e. of childbearing age at the time the policy was introduced)
30consistently registered an increase in welfare. In terms of magnitude, the welfare gain
of women in the treatment group is equivalent to the gain from going up one level on
a 12-category scale of income (this e⁄ect is largely constant along the income scale) or
of having higher rather than middle education. It is smaller (around one seventh) than
the corresponding welfare loss from being unemployed or separated.
Other women and men have not reported any signi￿cant e⁄ect. The e⁄ect on women
in the treatment group is stronger, the younger were the women when they received
birth control rights, the longer they were exposed to them. Marginal returns start to
decline after the woman is 35 years old. The possibility of a spurious correlation from all
women being happier than men and young women being happier than older women is
ruled out by the results of a control experiment. These e⁄ects are robust to alternative
speci￿cations and to the inclusion of age controls, country e⁄ects, year e⁄ects, and
country-speci￿c linear trends.
Life satisfaction e⁄ects are consistent with changes operating through economic
choices. The formalisation shows that if birth control rights a⁄ect the planning horizon
for women￿ s choices of education and work, we can expect that the liberalisation of birth
control rights is followed by an increase in women￿ s investment in education, in a higher
probability of working and in a higher income level. These three e⁄ects are strongly
supported in the data.
I have explored the strength of the result along several dimensions, taking into ac-
count possible elements of heterogeneity and econometric concerns. The identifying
assumption of the estimation is that no other shock has happened on the same countries
and years contemporaneously to changes in abortion rights. Since changes in abortion
laws exhibit quite a large variation among European countries, it is unlikely, although
it cannot be ruled out, that some event has exactly mimicked the time and geographic
pattern of abortion laws with e⁄ects on the same treatment group. To test for this pos-
sibility, two policies that are likely to have brought large changes in women￿ s welfare in
the same years are analysed: the legalisation of mutual consent divorce and the introduc-
tion of the pill in national public policies. This paper has not focused on them directly
because data are less reliable on these policies, but including them in the framework
shows the robustness of the e⁄ect of abortion rights on welfare. The analysis shows that
the introduction of the pill in national public policies had a positive e⁄ect on women￿ s
welfare, while mutual consent divorce laws decreased women￿ s welfare. It is plausible to
argue that abortion rights and the pill had a cumulative e⁄ect on welfare. The negative
e⁄ect of mutual consent divorce is consistent with the economic theory of it.
In addition to these two policies, the interaction of maternity leave policies with
abortion rights is investigated, but there are no convincing results on the substitutability
between the two or of an independent e⁄ect of maternity policies on women￿ s welfare.
Heterogeneity of treatment e⁄ects is considered along institutional di⁄erences, reli-
31gious characteristics, and variations in the intensity of rights. Econometric concerns of
endogenous legislation are discussed but they do not appear to apply. Finally, a series
of robustness checks and sensitivity analysis is presented.
These ￿ndings are interesting both from a historical point of view and in the context
of developing countries. One of the goals of development policy is the empowerment of
women. Considering that a third of countries, mainly developing ones, representing a
quarter of the world population, do not have abortion rights at all, these results may
provide some guidance on the e⁄ects of opening up to these rights. Despite institutional
di⁄erences that make the results not directly applicable to other societies, this analysis
suggest an important link between providing individual rights like birth control to women
and favouring their empowerment in other ￿elds.
The next step of the analysis will be to collect data on other policies that may have
a⁄ected women￿ s welfare, in particular on their access to contraceptive services, their
rights in the labour market, and investigate the e⁄ect of these policies on welfare as well
as on economic and demographic variables.
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358 Appendix: Data sources and description
All individual level data come from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File.
12 COUNTRIES: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece (since 1981), Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal (since 1985), Spain (since 1985), UK.
YEARS: 1975-1998 if not otherwise stated.
LIFE SATISFACTION: four-category variable, based on the question: "On the
whole, are you very satis￿ed, fairly satis￿ed, not very satis￿ed, or not at all satis￿ed
with the life you lead?". The possible answers are recoded as 4=very satis￿ed and
1=not at all satis￿ed.
TREATMENT GROUP: women of childbearing age when abortion legislation was
enacted.
WOMEN CONTROL GROUP: women who were not exposed to abortion rights
during their childbearing age. It comprises women who lived in a country which had not
legalised abortion, or who were over childbearing age when the law changed. The two
groups exhibit non-distinguishable e⁄ects.
MEN CONTROL GROUP: men in the same cohort of age as women in the treatment
group.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: dummies on gender, whether the person is work-
ing, married/cohabiting versus single, his level of education (low, middle, high), his
personal income on a 12 point scale.
AGE: ten-year age dummies (age less than 20, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, over
70).
FEEL RELIGIOUS: dummy equal to one if the person answers "religious" to any of
two questions: "Whether you do or you don￿ t follow religious practices, would you say
that you are... (religious, not religious, an agnostic, an atheist)" or: "Independently of
whether you go to church or not, would you say you are... (a religious person, not a
religious person, a convinced atheist)". The two questions are asked in di⁄erent waves.
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION: the Eurobarometer asks: "Do you regard yourself
as belonging to a religion? If yes, which of them?". Answers are coded separately for
Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Protestant and Other Protestant (compris-
ing Church of England and others).
LEFT-RIGHT SELF PLACEMENT: dummy derived from the question: "In political
matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on
this scale? 1. Left ...10. Right." Answers are coded as "Left" if between 1 and 4, as
"Centre" between 5 and 6, and "Right" between 7 and 10.
CATHOLIC COUNTRIES: countries with a majority of Roman Catholics (Greek Or-
thodox for Greece), as in parentheses. These are Belgium (75%), France (83-88%), Italy
("predominantly"), Luxembourg ("predominantly"), Ireland (91.6%), Greece (98%),
Spain (94%), and Portugal (94%). Non-Catholic countries in the sample are the Nether-
36lands (31%), Germany (34%), Denmark (3%), and the UK (predominately Anglican).
Source: CIA Intelligence Factbook 2002.
ABORTION LAWS: source: United Nations (2002).
NO-FAULT DIVORCE: source: Edlund, Haider and Pande (2003).
DATE OF INCLUSION OF ORAL PILL IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN-
NING: sources: Jones et al (1989), United Nations (2002).
MATERNITY LEAVE BENEFITS: the number of weeks of job-protected paid leave
due to pregnancy multiplied by the average wage replacement rate. These data have
been kindly provided by Christopher Ruhm.
PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN PARLIAMENTS: source: Inter-Parliamentary
Union (1995).
37 38









or by mutual 
consent 
Pill as part of 
public policy 
Belgium   1990 1975  1973 
Denmark   1973  1969  1973 
France   1975  1975  1967 
West  Germany  1976 1995  1976 1975 
Greece  1978 1986  1983 1980 
Ireland no  no  1995   
Italy   1978  1971  1971 
Luxembourg  1978   1975  
Netherlands   1981  1971  1969 
Portugal  1984   1975 1976 
Spain  1985   1981 1978 
United Kingdom    1967  1971  1961 
Note: European countries that do not appear here are not included in the analysis because of lack of data on 
life satisfaction. Details of all sources are provided in the Appendix. 
   
  Table A.2: Abortion laws in the world, 1997 
Abortion restrictiveness  Number of 
countries  % Population  Cumulative % 
pop. 
To save the woman’s life  54  25  25 
Physical health  23  10 
Mental health  20  4 
14 
Socio-economic grounds  6  20 
On request  49  41 
61 
Source: Rahman, Katzive and Henshaw (1998). 
 
  Table A.3: Timing of abortion laws and correlations with life satisfaction 
  Average life satisfaction for countries 
   More satisfied  Less satisfied 












  Table A.4: Timing of abortion laws and the percentage of women in Parliament  
   Average women in parl. in year of liberalisation of 
abortion rights 










Late  Belgium (1990)  
Greece (1986) 
Netherlands (1981) 
Germany (1995)  39
Table A.5: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Women (51.6% of the sample)          
Life satisfaction (1-4 scale)  237,505  3.054  0.774  1  4 
Age 237,134  43.1  17.9  15  99 
Personal income position  171,157  6.270  3.255  1  12 
Low Education  236,195  0.418  0.493  0  1 
High Education  236,195  0.135  0.342  0  1 
Working 237,505  0.346  0.476  0  1 
In a couple (married or de-facto)  237,505  0.604  0.489  0  1 
Men (48.4% of the sample)          
Life satisfaction (1-4 scale)  222,448  3.040  0.770  1  4 
Age 222,184  42.6  18.0  15  99 
Personal income position  165,860  6.790  3.190  1  12 
Low Education  221,201  0.372  0.483  0  1 
High Education  221,201  0.190  0.392  0  1 
Working 222,448  0.630  0.483  0  1 
In a couple (married or de-facto)  222,448  0.341  0.474  0  1 
Women treatment group (33.8% of the sample)        
Life satisfaction (1-4 scale)  149,173  3.049  0.764  1  4 
Age 148,877  36.4  13.2  15  80 
Personal income position  107,528  6.940  3.184  1  12 
Low Education  148,429  0.347  0.476  0  1 
High Education  148,429  0.166  0.372  0  1 
Working 149,173  0.442  0.497  0  1 
In a couple (married or de-facto)  149,173  0.641  0.480  0  1 
Women control group (17.8% of the sample)        
Life satisfaction (1-4 scale)  88,332  3.061  0.790  1  4 
Age 88,257  54.4  19.1  15  99 
Personal  income  63,629 5.138  3.052 1 12 
Low Education  87,766  0.537  0.499  0  1 
High Education  87,766  0.083  0.276  0  1 
Working 88,332  0.185  0.388  0  1 
In a couple (married or de-facto)  88,332  0.540  0.498  0  1 
Men control group (31.6% of the sample)        
Life satisfaction (1-4 scale)  139,752  3.025  0.760  1  4 
Age 139,571  36.0  13.4  15  99 
Personal  income  104,185  7.368  3.147 1 12 
Low Education  138,984  0.300  0.458  0  1 
High Education  138,984  0.221  0.415  0  1 
Working 139,752  0.729  0.444  0  1 
In a couple (married or de-facto)  139,752  0.592  0.491  0  1 
Life satisfaction - for whole sample  460,144  3.047  0.772  1  4 
- for indiv with low edu  181,090  2.932  0.810  1  4 
- for indiv with middle edu  150,869  3.089  0.750  1  4 
- for indiv with high edu  73,942  3.186  0.724  1  4 
- for indiv who works  222,471  3.069  0.746  1  4 
- for indiv who does not work  188,183  2.991  0.816  1  4 
- for single indiv  112,128  3.029  0.759  1  4 
- for in-couple indiv   284,143  3.088  0.762  1  4 
- with respect to income group  337,129  Monotonically increasing 
Country level       
Country-years with full abortion rights  250  0.51  0.50  0  1 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: The effect of abortion rights on welfare, DiD estimates, ordered probit 
 Depvar: Life Satisfaction  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Abortion rights at the time of the survey 0.138  0.121  0.108 
   (4.31)  (3.70)  (3.06) 
All women  0.028     
   (4.68)     
Treatment group: women with abort. rights when    0.047 0.069 
childbearing age    (7.20) (3.65) 
Control group: women without abort. rights or not    -0.005  -0.001 
of childbearing age with abort. rights    (0.53) (0.007) 
Control group: men with abort. rights in the same       0.025 
cohort of age as treatment group      (1.32) 
Age effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects, Year effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific linear trend  Yes Yes Yes 
P-value of F-tests:        
Women T-group - women C-group    0.00  0.00 
Women T-group - men C-group      0.00 
Pseudo R2  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Obs 459,953  459,953  459,953 
 
Marginal effects from probit     
Abortion rights at time of survey on Y3: Very satisfied  0.043  0.038  0.034 
 Y 2: Fairly satisfied  -0.008  -0.007  -0.007 
  Y1: Not very  -0.024 -0.021 -0.018 
  Y0: Not at all  -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 
All women on  Y3: Very satisfied  0.009     
 Y 2: Fairly satisfied  -0.002     
  Y1: Not very  -0.005    
  Y0: Not at all  -0.002    
Women in treatment group onY3: Very satisfied    0.015 0.022 
  Y2: Fairly satisfied    -0.004 -0.006 
  Y1: Not very    -0.008 -0.011 
  Y0: Not at all    -0.003 -0.005 
Women in control group on  Y3: Very satisfied    -0.018 2.74e-4 
  Y2: Fairly satisfied    4.35e-4 -6.81e-5 
  Y1: Not very    0.001 -1.43e-4 
  Y0: Not at all    4.08e-4 -6.30e-5 
Men in control group on  Y3: Very satisfied    -0.008 
 Y 2: Fairly satisfied    0.002 
  Y1: Not very   0.004 
  Y0: Not at all   0.002 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, from standard errors adjusted for clustering on country and year. Sample 
period is 1975-1998 for 12 countries. F-tests for the joint significance of fixed effects are significant at the 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: The distribution of gains and losses by marital status, education, working 
status 
  Depvar: Life Satisfaction 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Abortion rights at the time of the survey 0.074 0.086  0.090 
   (3.64)  (4.26)  (4.45) 
All women  0.004  0.012  0.021 
   (0.68)  (2.34)  (5.20) 
Treatment group and single -0.084     
 (11.38)     
Treatment group and in couple 0.094     
 (13.48)     
Treatment group and working   0.036   
     (5.47)   
Treatment group and non-work.   -0.022   
   (3.26)   
Treatment group and high edu     0.076 
       (11.81) 
Treatment group and low edu     -0.059 
     (11.03) 
Age effects  Yes Yes  Yes 
Country effects, Year effects  Yes Yes  Yes 
Country-specific linear trend  Yes Yes  Yes 
P-value of F-tests        
Treatment gp single- Treatment gp in couple  0.00     
Treatment gp working- Treatment gp non working  0.00   
Treatment gp high edu - Treatment gp low edu    0.00 
R2 0.95  0.95  0.95 
Obs 459,953  459,953  457,396 
Notes: t-statistics reported in parentheses, from standard errors adjusted for clustering on country and year. Sample 
period is 1975-1998 for 12 countries. No causality is clamed in these estimates, but purely a description of the 
distribution of gains and losses. “In couple” includes the two categories of being married and living in a de-facto 
couple. Fixed effects are jointly significant at one percent level in all specifications above. Definitions of all variables 
are provided in the Appendix.  44
  Table 5: Other policies in favour of women 
Depvar: Life Satisfaction 











    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Abortion rights at the time of the survey  0.069      0.085 
   (3.19)        (4.36) 
All  women  0.006 -0.028 0.043 0.011 -0.002 
   (0.44)  (4.14)  (3.99) (1.94) (0.25) 
Treatment group: women with abort.   0.016     0.044 
rights when childbearing age  (1.99)     (4.49) 
Pill in public policy  -0.136  -0.196       
 (3.41)  (4.52)       
Treatment group: women with pill in   0.055  0.055      
public policy when childbearing age  (7.95)  (8.36)      
Divorce rights  0.127    0.172     
   (3.21)    (4.48)     
Treatment group: women with divorce   -0.056   -0.034    
rights  (3.62)   (2.98)    
High maternity protection  0.044      0.040  0.054 
 (1.46)      (1.14)  (1.85) 
Treatment group: women with high   -0.003     0.004  -0.005 
maternity protection when childbearing age (0.34)     (0.69)  (0.39) 
T group (Abortion rights) * T group         -0.018 
(Maternity policy)          (1.25) 
Age effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific linear trend  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value of F-tests       
T group abort.- T group divorce  0.00         
T group abortion- T group pill  0.00         
T group abortion- T group maternity prot.  0.18        0.00 
T group pill– pill.    0.00       
Treatment gp divorce– divorce      0.00     
T group maternity pol.-interaction term      0.00   
T group maternity policy - maternity policy        0.07 
R2  0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Obs  414,351 459,953 459,953 414,351 414,351 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, from standard errors clustered on country and year. Sample period is 1975-1998 for 
12 countries. Fixed effects are jointly significant at 1 percent level in all specifications. In column 3 the treatment group 
is as for abortion rights, but in reference to data on contraception; it comprises women who, when the pill became part 
of public policies, were less than fifty. The indicator of maternity protection used is the number of weeks of job-
protected paid leave times wage replacement rate. Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix.  45
Table 6: Variations in treatment effects by religious variables 













    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Abortion  rights  -0.034 0.112 0.071 0.082 
    (1.52) (3.96) (3.23) (3.98) 
Treatment group: women with abort. rights  0.051 0.031 0.029   
when childbearing age  (4.49) (1.78) (2.23)   
Treatment group and feel religious     0.042  
     (5.47)   
Treatment group and Catholic      0.029 
      (4.37) 
Treatment group and Greek Orthodox     0.037 
      (1.54) 
Treatment group and Jewish      -0.039 
      (0.86) 
Treatment group and Muslim      -0.133 
     (2.65) 
Treatment group and Protestant       0.041 
      (4.32) 
Treatment group and other Protestant     0.071 
      (6.81) 
Control group: women without abort. rights or  -0.014  0.004  -4.26e-4  -0.007 
not of childbearing age with abort.  rights  (1.07) (0.42) (0.05) (1.00) 
Control group: men with abort. rights in the   0.002  0.027  0.017  -0.005 
same cohort of age as treatment  group  (0.19) (1.45) (1.36) (0.83) 
Age effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects, Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific linear trend  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value of F-tests:       
Women T group – women C group  0.00  0.04    
Women T group – men C group  0.00  0.38    
R2  0.96 0.94 0.95 0.95 
Obs  178,618 281,335 459,953 459,953 
Notes: t-statistics reported in parentheses, from standard errors adjusted for clustering on country and year. 
Sample period is 1975-1998 for 12 countries. Countries are classified as Catholic is they have a relevant majority of 
Catholics. These are Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Non-Catholic 
countries are the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and UK. Fixed effects are jointly significant at one percent 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  Table 8: Societal effect of abortion rights 
Depvar: Life Satisfaction  Set of individual characteristics interacted 
with abortion rights  β, t-stats β (abortion rights at 
time of survey), t-stats
1. By gender  Abortion rights * women  -0.120  0.129 
     (10.19)  (6.00) 
2. By having been treated  Abortion rights * women treatment group 0.009  0.101 
or not     (0.89)  (4.54) 
  Abortion rights * women control group  -0.065   
   (10.04)   
  Abortion rights * men treatment group  -0.016   
   (1.49)   
3. By age cohorts  Abortion rights* less than 20 years old  0.091  0.058 
   (2.86)  (1.79) 
  Abortion rights*20-29 years old  0.027   
   (0.89)   
  Abortion rights*30-39 years old  -0.002   
   (0.06)   
  Abortion rights*40-49 years old  0.008   
   (0.30)   
  Abortion rights*50-59 years old  -0.002   
   (0.08)   
  Abortion rights*60-69 years old  0.007   
   (0.37)   
4. Political self-placement  Abortion rights*left-wing  -0.026  0.025 
   (4.08)  (1.11) 
 Abortion  rights*right-wing  0.121   
   (16.53)   
5. Whether i feels religious Abortion rights*feel religious  0.070  0.057 
   (8.94)  (2.69) 
6. By gender, whether i   Abort* women *religious  0.047  0.057 
feels religious    (5.17)  (2.69) 
  Abort* men *religious  0.098   
   (11.85)   
7. By religious membership  Abort*Protestant 0.035  0.049 
   (4.04)  (2.16) 
 Abort*Catholic  0.045   
   (5.83)   
 Abort*Greek  Orthodox  0.038   
   (1.30)   
 Abort*Jewish  0.004   
   (0.11)   
 Abort*  Muslim  -0.158   
   (4.54)   
Always controlling for: Being in treatment and control groups 
Age, Country, Year effects, Country trend 
All regressions: R2= 0.95, Obs= 459,953. 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, from standard errors adjusted for clustering on country and year. Sample period is 
1975-1998 for 12 countries. Each set of individual characteristics is interacted in different regressions with abortion 
rights at time t in a regression that controls for abortion rights, being in the treatment group, women/men control 
groups, age, country, year fixed effects, country specific linear trend, and with clustered errors. Definitions of all 





















































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: coefficients on 10-year age dummies in an estimation of life satisfaction on 10-year age dummies, 
personal controls, country fixed effects, year fixed effects, country-specific linear trend, with standard 
errors clustered by country and year. 
 